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MEASURING DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
INDIVIDUALS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics' the United States Supreme Court considered an alleged
fourth amendment violation committed by federal agents operating
under color of federal law.2 In reversing the district and appeals
court dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the Court held
that the complaint stated a cause of action under the fourth amend-
ment and that money damages were an appropriate remedy.' As a
result of Bivens the fourth amendment (and arguably other consti-
tutional guarantees) can be used as the basis for a damage suit
against federal officials who violate an individual's consitutional
rights while acting under color of federal law.
Because Bivens creates the basis for a damage suit against
federal officials, a method of measuring damages resulting from
violations of constitutional rights must be developed. An analagous
cause of action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 has been in existence for some
time. Presumably, cases filed under the Bivens rule will be similar
to those filed under § 1983 and the courts will apply § 1983 damage
valuation standards to the new cause of action created in Bivens.5
The purpose of this note is to investigate the sufficiency of the
damage award system currently in use. Included is a critical analy-
sis of proposed systems for improving the ascertainment of
compensation for civil rights violations. After a brief discussion of
the value of retaining the traditional civil jury, a new proposal is
offered which permits the jury to treat violations of constitutional
1. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
2. Id. at 389-90.
3. Id. at 397.
4. § 1983 provides that:
Every person who under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, or any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party involved in any action of
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974).
5. The essential difference in the cases would lie in the source of authority cloaking the
defendant: the defendant under the Bivens cause of action would be operating under color of
federal law, whereas under § 1983 he would be operating under color of state law.
6. See note 5 supra.
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rights as causes of action separate and distinct from traditional torts
and compensate them accordingly.
CURRENT DAMAGE STANDARDS
Compensatory Damages
When hearing cases that allege a violation of constitutional
rights, courts must develop damage measurement standards. Since
the cases filed under the new cause of action will be similar to those
currently filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is likely that the courts
will look to these cases for guidance.' However, since possible consti-
tutional rights violations are not separated from other causes of
action (i.e., false imprisonment, assault, battery) in the § 1983
cases, it is difficult to discern a damage measurement standard from
them. Consequently, it cannot be determined if the violation itself
has been compensated. Even when it appears that the violation has
been compensated, it is impossible to determine what standards
were used in arriving at a final award.
In discussing the § 1983 cases, the first problem encountered
is determining whether the constitutional rights violation present in
the action was considered and compensated. The problem arises
because the final awards contain no mention of the fact that plain-
tiff's constitutional rights were violated. The case of McArthur v.
Pennington7 is illustrative. In this case plaintiff proved that he was
beaten by police officers during an illegal arrest., Present in this
case were the traditional torts of false arrest and battery. Plaintiff
also suffered a violation of his fourth amendment rights and a depri-
vation of the right to be free from unwarranted attacks upon the
integrity of his person. The final award consisted of $3401.49 for out-
of-pocket expenses and lost wages and $1698.51 for physical and
mental suffering, humiliation and injury to reputation? From this
judgment it cannot be determin rl whether the damages nclded
an award for the violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. If in
fact the violation was considered, it is impossible to determine what
standards were used to award damages.'"
7. 253 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
8. Id. at 428.
9. Id. at 430.
10. For other cases in which it was impossible to determine what damage standards
were used, see Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1973); Stolberg v. Members of Bd.
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CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES
The damage awards in § 1983 cases mirror the problems cre-
ated by the merger of traditional torts and violations of plaintiff's
constitutional rights. The plaintiff in Arroyo v. Walsh" received
$2500 for a broken nose sustained during a beating administered by
police officers during a false arrest." The plaintiff in Jackson v.
Dukes'3 received $5000 for similar injuries suffered under compara-
ble circumstances, and the disparity cannot be reconciled.' 4 It is
impossible to discover if the difference in the awards stems from an
attempt by the Jackson jury to compensate plaintiff for the viola-
tion of his constitutional rights.
A comparison of these awards with the award returned in
Collum v. Butler'5 clearly presents the problems encountered in
attempting to discover a damage standard for constitutional rights
violations. In the Collum case, the plaintiff proved that he received
a beating during a valid arrest.'" In contrast to Arroyo and Jackson
only the tort of battery and a deprivation of plaintiff's right to
preservation of the physical integrity of his person were violated.
Yet the jury returned a verdict of $17,500.1 If the jury was attempt-
ing to compensate plaintiff for the violation of his constitutional
rights it failed; the judge refused to accept the verdict, claiming it
shocked the "judicial conscience."' 8 If the judge in Collum believed
the Arroyo and Jackson cases to be comparable, then he clearly did
not attach monetary value to the deprivation of liberty without due
process. Plaintiffs in Arroyo and Jackson were falsely imprisoned
and should have received compensation for this wrong in and of
itself. Confusion such as this arises because it is unclear 1)which
wrongs were compensated, and 2)whether the constitutional rights
violations were considered as separate compensable acts.
of Trustees for State Colleges, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973); Horton v. Orange County Bd. of
Educ., 464 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970); Rolfe
v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968); Smith v. Hampton Training School for
Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel Neal v. Wolfe, 346 F. Supp. 569
(E.D. Pa. 1972); McBeth v. Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1270 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Antelope v.
George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (D. Idaho 1962).
11. 317 F. Supp. 869 (D. Conn. 1970).
12. Id. at 873.
13. 259 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1958).
14. Id. at 7.
15. 288 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970).
16. Id. at 919.
17. Id. at 920.
18. Id.
19741
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There are occasions when an award will specifically state that
damages for constitutional rights violations present in the action are
included in the final award. However, even when this is done, there
is no indication of the standards applied to the damage assessment.
In Rue v. Snyder ' the plaintiff recovered $650 for false arrest, false
imprisonment and the deprivation of his liberty without due process
of' law. 2" The final award explicitly stated that damages for the
violation of plaintiff's constitutional liberty were included in the
$650 recovery.' There was, however, no proportionate breakdown in
the final award isolating damages for the constitutional rights viola-
tions. In addition, there was no indication of the damage measure-
ment standards which were applied."
The lack of distinction between a violation of plaintiff's consti-
tutional rights and other causes of action present in a case is partic-
ularly critical when no strong traditional cause of action is present.
When a case consists solely of a violation of plaintiff's constitutional
rights, there is a strong possibility that the action will be dismissed
as de minimis.2 3 In such a case not only is plaintiff unable to be
compensated for the violation of his rights, but he loses the
opportunity to present his case in court. For example, in Northern
v. Nelson2' the plaintiff alleged and proved that the defendant
wrongfully confiscated plaintiff's newspapers.25 An apparent conver-
sion of the newspapers (value of $1.05) and a first amendment viola-
tion were present.2" Yet the action was dismissed as de minimis; 7
the lack of a strong traditional cause of action prevented the first
amendment violation from being considered."
19. 249 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
20. Id. at 743.
21. Id.
22. For other cases in which there is no indication of the damage measurement stan-
dards applied, see Sexton v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 904
(5th ... ), VV/. ,,,, 404 U.S. 0 0 i), Aue v. Snyder, 249 F. Supp. 740 th.U.
Tenn. 1966).
23. De minimis may be defined as a very small or trifling matter, BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 482 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
24. :315 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971).
25. 315 F. Supp. at 688.
26. 448 F.2d at 1266-67.
27. Id.
28. For other cases where the constitutional rights violation was dismissed as de
minimis because of the lack of a strong traditional cause of action, see Joseph v. Rowlen, 425
F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1970); Arunga v. New York City Dept. of Personnel, 342 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.
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CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES
Without a clear distinction between an alleged violation of
plaintiWs constitutional rights and the other causes of action pres-
ent in a given case, the consideration and awarding of damages for
these violations will continue to be nonexistent or inadequate. A
survey of existing case law indicates that adequate damage
standards cannot be developed until it is recognized that there ex-
ists a possibility of an award of damages for constitutional rights
violations separate and distinct from awards for other injuries.
Nominal and Punitive Damages
As is true with compensatory damages, the award of nominal
and punitive damages suffers from the lack of a clear distinction
between the constitutional rights violation proved by plaintiff and
other torts present in the case. Most courts presume nominal dam-
ages if the plaintiff can prove a violation of his constitutional rights.
An expression of this view can be found in United States ex rel.
Mottley v. Rundle,5 a false imprisonment case, wherein the court
stated: "Constitutional rights of a citizen are so valuable that an
injury is presumed to flow from the deprivation itself."30
There are courts which reject this position and hold that proof
of a violation of one's constitutional rights leads to no conclusion
concerning the existence of damages. In Jones v. Wittenberg31 the
court granted plaintiff an injunction when he proved that the condi-
tions of the jail in which he was legally confined violated the eighth
amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.2
However, absent proof of actual damages the court refused to award
even nominal damages. :
The Mottley holding is clearly the more satisfactory of the con-
flicting views. While it is often difficult to present proof of measura-
ble economic or physical loss resulting from a violation of one's
N.Y. 1972); Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Lowenstein v. McLaugh-
lin. 295 F. Supp. 638 (1). Mass. 1969). But see Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp.
1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
29. 340 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
30. Id. at 810-11. For other cases applying the same rationale, see International Prison-
ers Union v. Rizzo, 356 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Speaks v. McGregor, 355 F. Supp. 1129
(W.D. Va. 1973); Washington v. Official Court Steno., 251 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
31. 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio), supplemented, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
aff'd, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
32. 330 F. Supp. at 721.
33. Id.
19741
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constitutional rights, this difficulty should not preclude recovery. If
a jury finds that a violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights oc-
curred, the award of damages should depend solely upon its deliber-
ations. If it believes that the violation was minimal the jury should
be permitted to return a minimal award. To require that the plain-
tiff prove actual damage before allowing any award is to preclude
recovery in many cases and to deny the inherent value of constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights.
Punitive damages are traditionally awarded for engaging in
conduct so far removed from social standards that the jury believes
that the defendant acted maliciously, willfully or wantonly. 4 If pu-
nitive damages are to be awarded there must be a finding that in
fact plaintiff was harmed by defendant's acts; in other words, puni-
tive damages must be supported by an award of nominal or
compensatory damages.3 5 When punitive damages have been
awarded in cases containing both proven violations of plaintiff's
constitutional rights and other proven injuries, it is impossible to
determine whether the award was made for the traditional injuries
or the rights violations.36 If the purpose of punitive damages is to
punish defendant's actions, it is not apparent why in cases involving
violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights it is necessary to prove
physical or economic damage before punitive damages can be
awarded. If a jury decides that the violation of plaintiff's rights was
minimal but occurred in such a manner as to require punishment
or deterrence, its award of damages should not be disturbed.
Single Damage Award for Constitutional Rights Violations
To improve the award of damages for violations of a plaintiffs
constitutional rights in cases filed under § 1983 and the Bivens
cause of action it is suggested that the traditional categories of
34. See Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Trustees for State Colleges, 474 F.2d 489 (2d Cir.
1973); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972);
Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1970); Caplin v. Oak, 356 F. Supp.
1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971), supplemented,
346 F. Supp. 51 (D.N.J. 1972); Rhoads v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967).
35. Oilier v. Lake Central Airlines, Inc., 423 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1970); Worden v. Tri
State Ins. Co., 347 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1965).
36. See Gieringer v. Center School Dist. No. 58, 447 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1973); Sostre
v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Sandborn v. Wagner, 354 F. Supp. 291 (D. Md.
1973); Gaston v. Gibson, 328 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Brooks v. Moss, 242 F. Supp.
531 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
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19741 CONSTITUTIONAL DAMA GES
compensatory, nominal and punitive damages be abolished. Consti-
tutional rights are difficult to value since the violation of these
rights seldom creates measurable economic or physical loss. In a
case involving a constitutional rights violation, the jury attempts to
place a value on the damage suffered by the plaintiff because one
of' his constitutional rights was violated. The jury should separate
this consideration from its deliberations concerning damage caused
by traditional wrongs also present in the case.
It is maintained that the most accurate award for damages
resulting from a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights will re-
sult from a consideration of the circumstances surrounding each
case. An attempt to divide the damage question into compensatory,
nominal and punitive damages can only create confusion. Dealing
with violations of constitutional rights presents sufficient concep-
tual difficulties without requiring that the final damage award be
structured in traditional damage terms. By allowing the final award
to reflect the jury's deliberations as to the value of the right in
question, the extent of the violation, the circumstances surrounding
the violation and the defendant's culpability, the plaintiff's inter-
ests will be more adequately protected.
Having investigated current damage awards in § 1983 cases, it
is apparent that there is a definite need for improving the damage
award system when the plaintiff pleads and proves violations of his
constitutional rights. The primary difficulty with the present
method is in the merger of the rights violations and other wrongs
present in the case. This leads to a situation where the rights viola-
tion is either ignored or is compensated without reference to
established damage standards. Various proposals have been pre-
sented to improve the damage award system for constitutional
rights violations cases. Among these are a system of liquidated dam-
ages, a schedule of benefits to be applied to proven rights violations
and the removal of rights violation cases to a quasi-judicial hearing
board for extra-judicial determination of facts and damages. These
plans all suffer from the common defect of removing in whole or in
part the decision of damages from the jury.
PROPOSED SYSTEMS OF DAMAGE VALUATION AND AWARD
Liquidated Damages
One proposed solution to the damage award problem in cases
et al.: Measuring Damages for Violations of Individuals' Constitutional R
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involving constitutional rights violations would require Congress to
enact legislation creating a liquidated damage award for all proven
rights violations. 7 Under this proposal, if the plaintiff proved that
his constitutional rights were violated he would be entitled, at a
minimum, to the congressionally mandated recovery. If the plaintiff
could prove damages beyond the minimum award he would be enti-
tled to unlimited recovery.3 9 The mandated minimum recovery
would serve as the standard recovery for constitutional rights viola-
tions of all types.
This plan does not deal with the question of the merger of the
rights violations with other traditional wrongs present in the action.
There is no insight offered to the jury into the problem of deciding
whether a rights violation is present in any given case. Further, it
is not clear whether the mandated minimum would be the mini-
mum award for all damages or the minimum for the violation of
constitutional rights.
Beyond these initial conceptual difficulties, there are many
practical problems involved with the implementation of this pro-
posal. Formulation of proper minimum awards would create serious
legislative difficulties. The necessary congressional debate on the
required legislation would place the problem of valuing individual
rights into the political arena. While it is true that legislatures often
debate personal rights and freedoms, the resulting legislation is
general in nature and allows for application on a case by case basis.40
The creation of a general constitutional rights violation damage
award would depart from this pattern. In essence, Congress would
substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Congress would deliber-
ate and decide on a value for the various constitutional rights, and
this value would be imposed on all future cases. There is no provi-
sion for the compensation of technical violations of constitutional
rights with less than the mandated award. Finally, if the jury felt
that the facts did not warrant an award of the mandated minimum
amount, the inflexibility of the minimum recovery plan could well
prompt a refusal to find that a constitutional right was violated.
The value of a consitutional right must depend upon the cir-
37. Satler & Kalom, Damages for False Arrest, 6 TmAI 41, 45 (June-July 1970).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1974).
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CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES
cumstances surrounding each individual case if a violation of that
right is to be properly compensated. While the minimum recovery
proposal might encourage prospective plaintiffs to file actions in an
attempt to vindicate their rights, it gives no assurance that the right
will be properly considered and compensated.
Schedule of Damages
A second proposal to improve the award of damages for viola-
tions of individual constitutional rights requires the creation of a
workmen's compensation type schedule of benefits.' Under this
plan Congress would create a comprehensive list of possible viola-
tions of constitutional rights and would mandate a minimum and
maximum recovery for each.2 The exact amount of recovery would
depend upon the facts of each case and would be determined by the
trier of fact.4 3 Although similar to the liquidated damages proposal,
this plan would include mandated maximum recoveries and would
limit recovery to those violations included within the schedule of
benefits."
In addition, however, Congress would not only legislate the
amount of recovery possible but would, in effect, limit plaintiff's
damage remedy for rights violations to only those types of violations
it chose to compensate. Thus, a successful damage action for an
alleged violation of constitutional rights would be dependent upon
the will of Congress. If Congress failed to include the conduct al-
leged on the schedule of benefits, recovery would be impossible.
Since damages serve useful punishment and deterrence functions in
addition to compensating victims for their injuries, the limitation
of the damage action would weaken the citizens' position with re-
spect to the protection of their constitutional rights.
The minimum and maximum recoveries also preclude the jury
from exercising full discretion in its deliberation of damages for
constitutional rights violations. Furthermore, no provision is made
for the possibility of a technical violation occurring in circumstances
which do not make it worthy of the minimum damage recovery. The
essence of the plan is a substitution of congressional judgment for
41. Roche, A Viable Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule: A Civil Rights Appeal Board,
30 WASH. & LEE L. Rzv. 223 (1973).
42. Id. at 225.
43. Id. at 228.
44. Id.
19741
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that of the jury. Thus, beyond limiting the type of violations for
which damages may be awarded, the plan gives no guidance to the
jury to aid it in finding that a violation occurred; nor does it aid it
in developing standards to apply to the problem of reviewing the
circumstances of each given violation to determine the exact
damage recovery. The establishment of minimum and maximum
limits on the damage recovery neither aids the decision making
process nor improves the final award. It only places unnecessary and
undesirable limits on the deliberations of the jury.
The entire subject of damages for violations of constitutional
rights does not seem suited to a mechanical approach. While it is
possible that medical proof concerning injury and extent of disabil-
ity may be sufficiently standardized to allow creation of a schedule
of benefits applicable to physical injury cases, violations of constitu-
tional rights are not so standard. Each violation is dependent upon
the sum of the circumstances surrounding the violation and must
be compensated as such. An ad hoc determination of damages is
necessary to provide the best award.
Quasi-Judicial Hearing Board
A third proposal for improving the method of compensating
violations of constitutional rights was presented by Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Burger in his dissent to the Bivens decision.15 According to the
Chief Justice, Congress should remove jurisdiction over violations
of constitutional rights from the courts and place it in a quasi-
judicial hearing board.4 This board would be staffed by attorneys,
and its awards would be in lieu of any judicial proceedings. 7
Under this proposal the board would create its own procedural
45. 403 U.S. 422 (1971). The purpose of Chief Justice Burger's suggestion is to create
an alternative to the exclusionary rule. According to the Chief Justice, a quasi-judicial review
would be more effective than the exclusionary rule in that it would directly penalize police
for violating a citizen's rights, Further, it would be available to all persons whose rights have
been violated, instead of only to those persons whose cases eventually reach trial. However,
allowing suils br mooey damages would accomplish the same objectives as the quasi-judicial
hearing boards and would have the advantage of not requiring an outlay of funds to create
the mechanics of the Chief Justice's system. The suits could be filed within the existing court
system. See also Berch, Money Damages for Fourth Amendment Violations by Federal
Officials, 1971 LAW & SOCIAL ORDER 43.
46. 403 U.S. 422 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 423.
[Vol. 8
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1974], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss2/7
CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES
rules,', thus freeing them from the burdens of the normal rules of
procedure. Among these are the granting of immunity to certain
classes of individual and institutional defendants, the problem of
providing the plaintiff with defendants to be sued and the practice
of allowing mitigation of damages by considering the plaintiff's
moral position in the case."' The awards of this board would be
subject to judicial control through appellate procedures and court
enforcement of board awards.'
The Burger proposal can be criticized on several grounds. First,
the subject of constitutional rights violations should not be removed
from the judicial sphere. Traditionally, specialized hearing boards
have been created when a high level of expertise in a particular field
was necessary to render adequate decisions.51 The subject of dam-
ages for violations of constitutional rights is not a subject requiring
specialized knowledge. The creation of a specialized hearing board
would isolate the entire proceeding from community standards and
values. Although greater potential for standardized awards is pres-
ent in this plan, the quasi-judicial hearing boards would not im-
prove the adequacy of the awards.
In addition, it is not clear what portion of the case would be
removed to the hearing board. If the board is only to hear the case
for determination of the question of damages for violations of consti-
tutional rights, the entire action would have to be re-tried in court
to determine the outcome of the traditional causes of action present.
This is needless duplication of effort. The courts are equipped to
continue hearing cases dealing with constitutional rights violations.
They are the proper place for the action to be heard.
RETENTION OF THE JURY FOR DAMAGE VALUATION
The major criticism of the Chief Justice's proposal, like that of
the other proposals discussed, is that it removes the question of
damage valuation from the jury. It is the contention of this note that
in addition to stressing the independent nature of violations of
constitutional rights, the question of damage valuation must rest
48. Id. at 423-24 n.7.
49. Id. at 423.
50. Id.
51. R. LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 33 (1969); P. WALL, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW 5-8 (1963).
19741
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entirely with the jury. Only the jury can properly consider the fac-
tors involved in such a violation and return a verdict which is both
adequate and acceptable to both parties involved and society in
general.
There is a long tradition of allowing the jury to value damages
involved in a suit.5 The jury system was considered so important
by our Founding Fathers that a guarantee of a jury trial was in-
cluded in the Constitution.53 In addition, the jury is the best repre-
sentative of the people. Judges and attorneys (including attorneys
serving as hearing officers) are not representative of the average
citizen, because they are trained and educated far beyond the com-
munity norm. 54 By virtue of this training they view problems from
a different perspective then the average citizen. Congress and other
legislatures are also removed from the public.55 Each legislator fil-
ters community values through a framework of overriding
commitments and priorities. The need to satisfy a broad base of the
population while not antagonizing the power structure forces the
legislator to consider factors beyond the narrow question of award-
ing damages for violations of individual rights. The legislature is
separated from the community by time, distance and bureaucracy. 5
In contrast, a jury composed of average community members is
reflective of community values and standards. The members of the
jury have no commitments or responsibilities beyond deciding the
case at hand.
The fact that the jury is a small unrelated group of individuals
deliberating in private improves the quality of the final decision. 57
Psychological studies prove that decisions are fairer, more accurate
and are more efficiently reached when achieved under conditions
simulating jury deliberations.5" Prejudice and bias are exposed and
can be controlled more effectively, and the pressure of an unpopular
52. C. JOINER, CIvIL JUSTICE AND THE JUvY 39-63 (1962) (hereinafter cited as JOINER).
53. The United States Constitution provides, "In suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
54. JOINER, supra note 52 at 17.
55. Kreindler, The Jury System in Court Cases, in THE JURY 9 (G. Winters ed. 1971).
56. Id.
57. JOINER, supra note 52 at 25-35.
58. Id.
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decision is shared by an anonymous group rather than one individ-
ual."5
The major criticisms of the jury system are that it is arbitrary,
subject to prejudice, expensive and time-consuming.Y° Studies have
shown that the actual time required for a bench trial is not signifi-
cantly less than that for a full jury trial.' As to the question of
prejudice and arbitrariness, these seem to be more a criticism of the
decision-making process itself than of the jury system as a vehicle
of that process.6" Judges, attorneys, legislators and hearing officers
are all human and are subject to the same bias and prejudice as the
typical jury member. While training and experience may remove
some prejudice, it may also allow the judge or attorney to become
more adept at masking his bias to the point where he actually be-
lieves himself to be free of this wholly human trait.13 As long as
humans make the final decisions in legal proceedings the results will
be subject to bias, prejudice and arbitrariness.
Because of the strong tradition favoring the jury over the judge
or hearing officer in the matter of valuing violations of constitu-
tional rights, any proposal which in whole or in part removes the
issue from the jury has an inherent weakness: the community ap-
proval of damage awards may be lost. It is the people's rights which
are violated, and the task of the legal system is to provide a system
of compensation which is acceptable to the people. The people favor
the jury system for the determination of damages 4 and any device
which removes the damage award issue from the sole province of the
jury would undermine the public's acceptance of the legal system
itself.
CONCLUSIONS
Any proposed system for measuring damages for violations of
constitutional rights must fully involve the jury in the decision-
59. Id.
60. Clark, The American Jury: A Justification, in THE JuRY 1, 5 (G. Winters ed. 1971).
61. Id. at 5-6.
62. JOINER, supra note 52 at 70.
63. Id.
64. The degree of public acceptance of the jury system can be ascertained from these
statistics found in JOINER, supra note 52. Over 70% of the general public favors jury trials as
opposed to only 9% favoring trials by judge alone. The other 21% are undecided. Of those
having previous jury experience, the percentage favoring jury trials increases to 77%. Id. at
64.
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making process. The scope of the jury's deliberations should not be
artificially restricted by Congress, nor should the question of dam-
ages be removed from the jury and placed before a quasi-judicial
hearing board. The jury system can be criticized because its damage
awards are not standardized and are essentially ad hoc decisions as
to the value of the constitutional rights violation in question. While
it seems true that damage awards for rights violations do not always
deal adequately with the question of the intangible injury suffered
by plaintiff as a result of the violation, it is contended that this
problem is not inherent in the jury system itself. The inadequate
compensation of constitutional rights violations stems from the fact
that there has not been sufficient emphasis placed on the fact that
a constitutional rights violation is compensable in and of itself.
Failure to instruct the jury as to the separability of the causes of
action has lead to the problem of inadequate or nonexistent damage
awards.
An improved damage measurement system for cases dealing
with violations of constitutional rights requires more than the op-
portunity to present the damage question to the jury independent
of other causes of action. If the jury system is to be efficient there
must be a controversy for the jury to hear. As long as constitutional
rights violations cases continue to be restricted by traditional con-
cepts of immunity a full deliberation of the issues will not be possi-
ble.5
A second problem arises once the plaintiff's case is allowed into
court. The traditional tort defenses tend to obscure the fact that
constitutional rights violations are not always susceptible to tradi-
tional methods of proof. However, since the effectiveness of any
defense is based upon the allegations which are proved to the satis-
faction of the jury, a proper jury instruction as to the segregation of
the rights violation from the other actions present will equip the jury
to deal with the problem effectively.
65. On remand from the Supreme Court the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided
the immunity question against the defendants. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972). In essence the court held that while
federal officers were operating within the outer limits of their authority, they would be
granted immunity unless performing the type of discretionary acts for which they would not
require immunity.
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Proposed Final Jury Instruction
Implementing the above suggestions would significantly im-
prove the damage valuation system employed in cases of violations
of constitutional rights. Necessary for the final improvement of the
system and vital to the successful implementation of the above
suggestions is an instruction to the jury which stresses the fact that
a rights violation is compensable in and of itself. In an effort to make
the application of this proposed instruction clear the following situ-
ation will be presumed.
Plaintiff has alleged and proved that federal agents entered his
home, verbally and physically abused him and his family, searched
the home and offered no search warrant as justification for their
actions. Defendants were denied immunity under the Bivens
rationale'a since they were not engaged in the discretionary type of
acts for which immunity was necessary. Their defense is that they
acted in good faith and in a reasonable belief that both the search
and the method in which it occurred were valid.
There are traditional torts involved in this case, including as-
sault, battery, false imprisonment and possible intentional inflic-
tion of mental distress. Traditional instructions for each of these
torts would be given to the jury. In addition, a separate instruction
dealing with the fourth amendment violation would be read to the
jury as follows:' 7
In addition to other claims for damage, the plaintiff in
this case claims damage for the alleged violation of his
fourth amendment rights by defendant federal agents. The
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution reads
as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, sup-
66. See note 65 supra. In accordance with the finding of the court of appeals in Bivens
federal police officers have no immunity to protect them from damage suits for violations of
constitutional rights while pursuing alleged violators of narcotics laws or other criminal
statutes.
67. A general outline for the proposed jury instruction was obtained from 2 E. DEvrrr
& C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS 125, 285-304 (2d ed. 1970).
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ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Plaintiff specifically alleges that the defendants by their
acts did knowingly violate his fourth amendment rights.
The defendants admit that they entered plaintiff's
house and conducted a search therein, but they deny that
they did this in knowing violation of plaintiff's rights. They
claim that they entered the house as the result of a mistake
and conducted the search in the manner that they did be-
cause they believed that they were entering a house occu-
pied by known dealers in dangerous drugs.
In order to find for the plaintiff, it must be established
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants
entered plaintiff's house designedly and not as a result of a
mistake. Plaintiff must also prove that defendants' actions
violated plaintiff's fourth amendment rights. If you find
that plaintiff has sustained his burden of proof you may
find for the plaintiff and award him money damages for the
violation of his rights.
If you find that the defendants violated plaintiff's
fourth amendment rights your task is to place a monetary
value on those rights. To do this you should look at the
evidence presented in this case. You are attempting to de-
termine what it is worth to the plaintiff to be free from
unreasonable searches. Your final award should reflect the
value you place on plaintiff's fourth amendment rights.
You should consider the circumstances of the violation and
the possible culpability of the defendants. The award at
which you arrive is solely for the fourth amendment viola-
tion. Other awards of damage may be given for injuries that
the plaintiff may have suffered as a result of other wrongs
present in this case. Any other awards of damages you make
in this case are not to be considered when you are deciding
on the award for the fourth amendment violation, if you
find that such a violation in fact occurred. A violation of the
fourth amendment is a proper subject of damages in and of
itself.
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CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES
This case should be considered and decided by you as
an action between persons of equal standing in the com-
munity, of equal worth and holding the same or similar
station in life. The law is no respecter of persons; all persons
stand equal before the law and are to be dealt with as
equals in a court of justice. You are to perform your duty
as jurors without bias or prejudice as to any party. Our
system of law does not permit jurors to be governed by
sympathy, prejudice or public opinion. Both parties and
the public expect that you will carefully and impartially
consider the evidence presented and the law as stated and
will reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences.
It is the contention of this note that the above proposed jury
instruction allows the jury to consider the alleged violation of plain-
tiffs constitutional rights as a separate and independent cause of
action and award damages based on the violation itself. Further,
this instruction offers guidance concerning the factors to be consid-
ered when deliberating the question of the damage award. By pres-
enting a separate instruction to the jury, the court assures itself not
only that the question of the violation of plaintiff's rights is being
considered, but also that it is being considered within the guidelines
of the instruction.
Damages for violations of constitutional rights will be awarded
on an ad hoc basis, but they will be the result of a specific instruc-
tion to the jury. Further standardization of the damage award seems
impossible without removing the question in whole or in part from
the province of the jury and requiring that some official, hearing
officer or legislative body substitute its values and judgment for that
of the jury. The pattern jury instruction above stresses the constitu-
tional rights violation as actionable in its own right and requires the
jury to award damages for the violation separate from other wrongs
present in the case. The use of such an instruction allows for the
standardization of the decisional guidelines within the framework of
the jury system, and awards of damages for violations of constitu-
tional rights may thus become a regulated, systematic procedure
within the body of the present civil jury trial.
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